title: ADOMS IID
link: https://adomsiid.org
description: Antigua and Barbuda Department of Marine Services and Merchant Shipping - Inspection and Investigation Division
generator: https://wordpress.org/?v=6.2.5
language: de-DE
errorsto: lucidiot@brainshit.fr

title: Clavigo – Contact and consequent grounding
link: https://adomsiid.org/clavigo-contact-and-consequent-grounding
description: A general cargo vessel grounded after experiencing heavy weather at anchorage. To read the full marine safety investigation report, please follow the link: MV CLAVIGO Marine Safety Investigation Report
last-modified: 2023-05-24T13:34:00Z
guid: https://adomsiid.org/?p=933
subject: Casualty Reports

title: Fairplay-33 – Fatal accident
link: https://adomsiid.org/fairplay-33-fatal-accident
description: A crew member fell overboard between a tug and an alongside barge. Tragically even though immediate rescue was initiated, the crew member could not be retrieved in time to save his life. To read the full marine safety investigation report, please follow the link: MV FAIRPLAY-33 Marine Safety Investigation Report
last-modified: 2022-05-11T10:07:00Z
guid: https://adomsiid.org/?p=917
subject: Casualty Reports

title: Francop – Fatal accident
link: https://adomsiid.org/francop-fatal-accident
description: A crew member was fatally injured during cargo operations in the port of Dublin. To read the full safety investigation report, please follow the link: MV FRANCOP, IMO 9277412, fatal accident
last-modified: 2022-03-02T11:18:15Z
guid: https://adomsiid.org/?p=910
subject: Casualty Reports, Uncategorized

title: Palmerton – Lifeboat accident
link: https://adomsiid.org/palmerton-lifeboat-accident
description: Two crew members were executing an ordered task on the free-fall lifeboat of MV PALMERTON when it unintentionally released and fell to the water causing the death of two crew members. To read the full marine casualty investigation report, please follow the link: MV PALMERTON, IMO 9501863, lifeboat accident
last-modified: 2021-02-26T14:00:10Z
guid: https://adomsiid.org/?p=886
subject: Casualty Reports, Uncategorized

title: Hanse Fortune – Fatal Accident
link: https://adomsiid.org/hanse-fortune-fatal-accident
description: The crew of MV HANSE FORTUNE were preparing the vessel for sea after finishing with cargo operations. The ship’s own cargo spreader was to be stowed on the forward hatch cover between two stacks of containers. The signalling crew member was fatally struck by the spreader during the process. To read the full marine safety investigation report, please click on below link: MV HANSE FORTUNE, IMO 9316103, fatal accident
last-modified: 2021-02-26T13:21:19Z
guid: https://adomsiid.org/?p=884
subject: Casualty Reports, Uncategorized

title: Gerhard G – Fatal accident
link: https://adomsiid.org/fatal-accident-gerhard-g
description: MV GERHARD G experienced a fatal accident on board during bulkhead shifting by hatch gantry crane in the port of Rotterdam in November 2014. To read the full marine safety investigation report, please follow the link below: MV GERHARD G, IMO 9534286, fatal accident
last-modified: 2021-02-26T12:43:53Z
guid: https://adomsiid.org/?p=867
subject: Casualty Reports

title: TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT
link: https://adomsiid.org/too-close-for-comfort
description: During sea passage in the Mediterranean Sea an A & B flagged general cargo vessel collided with another cargo vessel, causing it to sink in minutes and tragically the death of 10 crew. The A & B flagged vessel suffered only minor damages to its bow and no one was injured on board. NarrativeThe collision took place in the early morning hours, in darkness but good visibility and calm seas. On taking over the watch the later sunk vessel was part of the watch handover, about 17 nm ahead on a nearly reciprocal course, clearly showing on the radar. The OOW on the A&B vessel’s bridge took the approaching vessel as an ARPAR target and when it came in sight, judged by the navigation lights he saw and the CPA shown by the radar that all would go clear with a green to green passing. At a distance of around 3.5 nm to the approaching vessel the OOW on the A&B vessel, still thinking all will go clear with 0.8 nm as CPA after altering course by a couple of degrees to port, left the console to check the position and enter information into the log book.  On return to the cons the OOW immediately saw something was wrong as he could now see the red port light of the approaching vessel which meant a collision was imminent.  Jumping to the rudder and switching steering to manual mode, the OOW set hard to starboard but tragically this was too late and both vessels collided heavily. After the heavy impact all crew were alerted and involved in the rescue of the sinking ship’s crew. Crew members were saved by the A&B vessels crew over the bow by pulling them out of the big gash in the other vessels hull and accommodation. Sadly the foundering of the other vessel went so fast that not all crew could be rescued, as most of them must have been asleep in their cabins. It could never be assessed why the foundered vessel suddenly took a hard right turn as all was apparently clear. The manoeuver was much too late and a collision could under these circumstances not be avoided. Findings and RecommendationThis tragic incident could have been avoided by a clear course change by the A&B vessel to starboard well before, to pass red to red, thus giving room for a safe passing in the open sea. Further a lookout as required in darkness could have warned the OOW immediately when the other vessel started turning, maybe increasing the chance of a successful last moment manoeuver. It is also recommended to increase the awareness of watch keeping bridge personnel by more training in the line of bridge resource management and safe, proactive and good seamanship like behaviour. Another factor that possibly contributed to the very serious casualty was the overreliance on electronic helpers, giving a false sense of safety when it would have been necessary to stay at the cons until the situation had passed. 
last-modified: 2019-06-21T13:22:23Z
guid: http://adomsiid.org/?p=234
subject: Casualty Reports

title: BASKETFALL
link: https://adomsiid.org/basketfall
description: An Antigua & Barbuda registered vessel experienced a fatal accident on board during bulkhead shifting by hatch gantry crane in the port of Rotterdam. To release the securing pins of the bulkhead, a person’s basket/cage attached to the hatch gantry with an electric chain hoist with a single point fix, was used. The swivel hook of the electric chain hoist broke at the connection point, letting the person basket fall about 5 m to the bottom of the hatch causing the death of the suspended crew member. After the able seaman had fallen into the cargo hold, the pilot, who was still on board, immediately called an ambulance. All efforts by the crew prior to the arrival remained without effect, and the doctor was only able to pronounce the sailor’s death. The hatch gantry and the attachable hoists (1 on each side) are not considered as lifting appliance as they are part of the hatch cover (moving) system and not to lift cargo or any other gear. This may mean that during the mandatory survey of lifting appliances through the classification society, the equipment in question would not be included and thus could cause a lack of maintenance supervision and control. The requirements given are the manufacturer’s maintenance requirements and the ILO work safety regulations. These give clear guidance on the one hand, how to maintain the chain hoists, and on the other what is expected in the sense of overall safety during usage of such gear. It is clear from the manual provided by the chain hoist manufacturer that it is not to be used for the lifting of persons, except, if some sort of safety device is installed that prevents the person basket from falling (fall arrest or preventer). The aim of the investigation conducted is to raise awareness of the shipping community in regard to the safety issues of electrical tackles used for the lifting of persons as intended by the hatch gantry manufacturer without a fall preventer or arrest and the importance of maintenance and testing of this equipment even though it is often not part of the official lifting appliances but falls under ILO convention 152, work safety. If the electrical tackles manufacturer’s instruction/certification would have been followed by the hatch gantry manufacturer and the vessels managing company, no persons would have been lowered and lifted without a fall arrest/preventer. This very important factor was either ignored or not noticed as full Dutch certification was achieved and the system sold to many clients. Personal safety is a personal responsibility even if the equipment has been certified and installed during the build phase of a vessel. The competent person who checks the gear prior to its use should be trained in safety awareness and the requirements as per definition in ILO 152. This includes supervision of storage and maintenance and especially the diligent check before setting up and commencing operation. Last but just as important, the persons involved in the direct operation of the equipment, in this case the person basket and attached electrical tackle hanging from the hatch gantry on one single point, must also […]
last-modified: 2019-06-21T13:31:16Z
guid: http://adomsiid.org/?p=236
subject: Casualty Reports

title: TILT AND ROLL
link: https://adomsiid.org/tilt-and-roll
description: Two stevedores were fatally injured during cargo operations on board of a 130 m long multi-purpose dry cargo ship. NarrativeIn port, a vessel of 7000 GT was berthed starboard side and started to load loose steel pipes in a centre tween deck. The vessel was partly loaded and the stevedores commenced the pipe stowage on port side. The stevedores first stacked a complete layer of pipes starting from the hold’s side and hold wall towards the opposite side. The second, third and fourth layer were placed without using the whole width of the hold as the slight list to port prevented the pipes from rolling. The loading process was interrupted when a container with lashing material on deck was to be placed onto the pier. When the vessel’s aft crane swung around to put the container on the pier, the vessel slightly moved over to starboard. As a consequence, the unsecured pipes rolled over to starboard and crushed two stevedores who were standing on the pipes. The stevedores were both fatally injured. FindingsAlthough professional longshoremen were employed to load the pipes, the whole gang ignored basic safety regulations. Their behaviour was negligent and not professional. None of the five longshoremen had raised concerns related to the risk potential of unsecured stowage. It even appears that the longshoremen intended to take advantage of the vessel’s minimal port list to be able to stow without securing the layers of pipes with wedges. RecommendationOn duty, officers of the watch should always be involved in the operations on board their vessel to ensure own safety awareness is kept upright at all times.
last-modified: 2019-06-21T13:20:10Z
guid: http://adomsiid.org/?p=232
subject: Casualty Reports

title: RICE ON THE BEACH
link: https://adomsiid.org/rice-on-the-beach
description: A general cargo vessel on a single charter voyage from Asia to West Africa grounded on the South African coast due to an engine failure paired with lack of decision making efficiency by the involved ashore and on board as time was paramount. Laden with about 15 000 t of rice in bags, the vessel was on her first voyage after having been laid up for quite some time in insolvency.  The ship managers and owners were convinced that the financial situation of the insolvent ship would improve to allow long due crew payments and urgently required spare parts and repairs. All senior officers were aware of the situation and had taken care to keep the vessel running by applying the vessel’s crew skills and ingenuity. On approaching Southern Africa the engine temperatures rose. The reduction of revolutions did not assist in lowering the temperatures and after a scavenge air fire was suspected and consultation with the shore management and engine manufacturer, it was decided to switch off the engine and look for possible solutions. Drifting at a first safe distance to the dangerous coast line, the root search continued which was aborted when the distance to shore reduced and weather deterioration was expected. A new problem arose when the engineers were not able to restart and a solution could not be found. In the meantime, with ongoing communication between the ship, the management and the always involved insolvency administrator, time passed which was not available. In the course of back and forth discussions it was decided to charter an Offshore Supply Vessel available which commenced for the powerless, drifting vessel. On arrival the weather had as expected deteriorated and a connection between the OSV and the vessel in distress after many attempts could not be established. Only at this moment did the master inform the South African rescue coordination authorities of the imminent danger of grounding and the required help. This was too late and as a consequence the grounding in a nature reserve could not be avoided. The vessel’s crew was airlifted off the stranded ship and the South African officials took over the situation. After pumping out as much oil as possible and airlifting it off the ship, the salvage tug pulled the Antigua & Barbuda flagged vessel off the beach out to sea where it sunk at approximately 1000 m depth. During the conducted investigation a relation between the vessel’s casualty and insolvency could be established. The insolvency administrator had, over quite some time taken over all decision making that involved finances and thus also in this situation the vessel’s managers did only in the last moment make an urgently needed decision, namely to charter a tug to tow the vessel to port. There was also a strong reluctance by the captain to make use of his overriding authority and ensure safety is upheld. The master was used to not being allowed to make decisions, so that he did not question the shore behaviour. The lesson learnt in this casualty is the need to, also in a situation of insolvency, have a clear chain of command. […]
last-modified: 2019-06-21T13:33:27Z
guid: http://adomsiid.org/?p=239
subject: Casualty Reports